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Abstract When is industry self-regulation (ISR) a legiti-
mate form of governance? In principle, ISR can serve the
interests of participating companies, regulators and other
stakeholders. However, in practice, empirical evidence
shows that ISR schemes often under-perform, leading to
criticism that such schemes are tantamount to firms
marking their own homework. In response, this paper
explains how current management theory on ISR has failed
to separate the pragmatic legitimacy of ISR based on self-
interested calculations, from moral legitimacy based on
normative approval. The paper traces three families of
management theory on ISR and uses these to map the
pragmatic and moral legitimacy of ISR schemes. It iden-
tifies tensions between the pragmatic and moral legitimacy
of ISR schemes, which the current ISR literature does not
address, and draws implications for the future theory and
practice of ISR.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility  Governance 
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Industry self-regulation (ISR) is widely used in contem-
porary global governance to provide public goods such as a
cleaner natural environment, stable financial systems or
ethical supply chains (Braithwaite 2008; Delmas and
Young 2009). Defined as the voluntary association of firms
to control their collective behaviour (King and Lenox
2000), ISR schemes have been used to regulate issues from
food labelling to privacy, from living wages to
environmental accounting standards, and from pollution to
Internet pornography. Proponents have argued that ISR can
achieve public policy objectives at lower cost than gov-
ernment regulation because regulatory decisions are made
by those with the best information and expertise to make
them (Coglianese and Mendelson 2010; Gunningham and
Rees 1997). ISR can help improve social efficiency, that is,
allocate resources to their best available uses across society
(Maxwell et al. 2000). ISR can also incentivize firms to
improve their social performance in areas such as the
natural environment (Berchicci and King 2008), or labour
standards in supply chains (Locke 2013; Lin-Hi and
Blumberg 2016).
Despite theoretical and practical enthusiasm for ISR,
questions remain about its legitimacy. Mounting empirical
evidence suggests that all too often industry-led schemes
do not lead to positive social benefits or fix the problems
that they are designed to solve (King et al. 2012). Recent
scandals on mislabelled horsemeat in food supply chains,
privacy in the self-regulated newspaper industry, and the
fatal collapse of the BSCI-certified Rana Plaza factory in
Bangladesh have fed popular scepticism that ISR is tanta-
mount to firms ‘‘marking their own homework’’. However,
as many teachers know, when done well, asking students to
mark their own homework can not only be efficient from
the teacher’s point of view, but also encourage students to
learn from each other and to reflect on their own perfor-
mance. Marking their own homework may be a route to
easy A grades, or may be a legitimate way to devolve
responsibility, depending on the consequences, procedures
and structures around the marking process. Current ISR
theory cannot yet tell the difference.
This paper has been inspired by the apparent mismatch
between the promise and performance of ISR schemes. It
maps what we know about the legitimacy of ISR schemes
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from management theory, shows where previous research
from different traditions has focused, and uses this to
explore blind spots, tensions and future directions on the
legitimacy of ISR. Explaining how and why the evaluation
of ISR schemes differs so much between theorists is a vital
step towards improving the performance of ISR schemes in
practice. Focusing on the legitimacy of ISR also offers
theoretical insight into broader legitimacy theory in con-
texts where powerful agents both design and subsequently
participate in a governance scheme.
Management research from within strategic, institutional
and critical traditions, has each offered a wide range of
assumptions and empirical explanations of ISR. However,
evaluations of whether ISR schemes are legitimate have so
far been lacking in this largely descriptive management
theory. If legitimacy is considered at all, management
theory usually focuses on pragmatic legitimacy, that is, on
‘‘the self-interested calculations of an organization’s
immediate audiences’’ (Suchman 1995: 578). Current
management theory has paid less attention to moral legit-
imacy, that is, a normative evaluation of whether ISR
participation is ‘‘the right thing to do’’ (Suchman 1995:
579).
This paper builds on Suchman’s (1995) framework and
separates the pragmatic legitimacy of ISR based on self-
interested calculations, from moral legitimacy based on
normative approval. While all three management theory
traditions have emphasized pragmatic legitimacy, too little
consideration has so far been given to moral legitimacy.
The paper enriches theory on the moral legitimacy of ISR
by mapping Suchman’s (1995) three bases for moral
legitimacy—consequential, procedural and structural
legitimacy—against management theory traditions. Map-
ping debates in this way is useful because previous studies
within each of the management traditions have tended to
implicitly assume which aspect of moral legitimacy is most
important based on the worldview of the analyst, rather
than the details of the empirical context. This paper draws
all three theoretical strands together for the first time and
provides a springboard to examine tensions and blind spots
on the legitimacy of ISR. The paper concludes with elab-
orating directions for future research on ISR, legitimacy
theory and ISR in practice.
Management Theories of Industry Self-Regulation
Industry self-regulation is the voluntary association of
firms to control their collective behaviour (King and Lenox
2000). ISR is ‘‘a regulatory process whereby an industry-
level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level, orga-
nization… sets and enforces rules and standards relating to
the conduct of firms in the industry’’ (Gupta and Lad 1983:
417). Management scholars have theorized ISR participa-
tion from three main perspectives: strategic, institutional
and critical perspectives, each of which is briefly intro-
duced in this section. The different perspectives illustrate
how various theorists have understood ISR schemes, which
has implications for whether and how the schemes are seen
as successful and legitimate.
Strategic Management Perspectives
First, within strategic management theory, ISR is described
as a solution to at least one of two strategic problems:
information asymmetry and common pool resources (King
and Toffel 2009). Outsiders are unable to directly observe a
firm’s social performance. Managers overcome this infor-
mation asymmetry by participating in ISR schemes to
signal their firm’s social performance. ISR schemes in
industries such as toy manufacturing (Lin-Hi and Blumberg
2016), cut flowers (Prado 2013), sustainable agriculture
(Blackman and Rivera 2011) or coffee (Reinecke et al.
2012) enable firms to signal their social or environmental
quality. Common pool resources, on the other hand, require
firms to collaborate to protect a shared resource such as the
industry’s reputation, access to physical assets or supply
chain resilience (Prakash and Potoski 2006; Barnett and
King 2008). Strategic perspectives emphasize that ISR
schemes are often led by dominant firms that have the
greatest interest in addressing the problem as with Nike or
Walmart’s leadership in collective efforts to eliminate
sweatshop labour from supply chains (O’Rourke 2003;
Locke et al. 2007).
Institutional Perspectives
In contrast, institutional theory emphasizes the role of
institutions in shaping collective actions on social or
environmental issues (Ostrom 1990; Hoffman 1999).
Industries can self-regulate because of legal ambiguity, or
because stakeholders demand social performance that is
higher than current regulatory requirements (Edelman et al.
1991; Gunningham and Rees 1997). For example, Zietsma
and Lawrence’s (2010) study of the evolution of decisions
on harvesting practices in the British Columbia forest
industry showed how managers actively participated in
creating, maintaining and disrupting industry collective
actions. ISR can also co-evolve with other institutions. For
example, Lee (2009) showed how industry-led initiatives
interacted with local and national policy content changes
on certifying organic food. Institutional perspectives
explain ISR as a way for managers to maintain confor-
mance with regulative, cognitive and normative require-
ments in the institutional environment (Hoffman 1999;
Matten and Moon 2008).
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Critical Management Perspectives
A third tradition, critical management theory, explains ISR
as ‘‘first and foremost about control’’ (Jermier et al. 2006,
p. 627). Critical theorists focus on the discourses around
proposed solutions to social problems, and the roles that
these discourses play in protecting corporate privilege and
power (Banerjee 2008). Managers use ISR to maintain
control over the rhetoric around social issues through
generating and maintaining symbols such as certifications,
logos, social reports and partnerships. Boiral (2013), for
example, theorized sustainability reports certified to the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) A or A? standard as
‘‘signs and images employed to control social representa-
tions’’ (p. 1037). Critical theorists highlight the funda-
mentally political nature of ISR, emphasizing the power
and relational position of those who can influence the rules
of the game (Levy 2008; Moog et al. 2015). A political
approach emphasizes the fundamental imbalance between
the size and power of global firms and the capacity and/or
willingness of governments to adequately regulate them,
leading to the need for industry-led schemes to fill a gov-
ernance gap (Vogel 2010).
The Legitimacy of Industry Self-Regulation
Management theorists from all three perspectives have
provided rich description and empirical results on the dri-
vers, forms and consequences of ISR. However, amid
accusations that firms and managers are marking their own
homework, more research attention is required on the
legitimacy of ISR schemes. Legitimacy is a ‘‘generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and defini-
tions’’ (Suchman 1995: 574). Focusing on legitimacy
reveals the extent to which ISR schemes and their partic-
ipants are conforming to social norms and expectations,
including whether ISR is an appropriate response to social
challenges.
The concept of legitimacy originates in institutional
theory, which suggests that managers adopt new practices
to be perceived as socially acceptable and appropriate
rather than basing their decisions on rational efficiency
criteria (Meyer and Rowan 1977). However, both strategic
and critical management theory also use variants of legit-
imacy. Strategic management theory tends to emphasize
the extent to which the approval of various stakeholder
groups influences firms’ social strategy (e.g. Darnall et al.
2009; Kassinis and Vafeas 2006). In contrast, the critical
approach delves more deeply into the processes by which
firms seek and earn legitimacy through their social
disclosures and actions (e.g. Crane 2000; Fineman and
Clarke 1996).
Numerous typologies of legitimacy have been proposed
in the literature (see Bitektine 2011 for a review), but the
most widely used is Suchman’s (1995) distinction between
pragmatic and moral legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is
based on the self-interested calculations of an organiza-
tion’s immediate audiences, whereas moral legitimacy is a
broader normative evaluation of social appropriateness.
Suchman’s original categorization also included cognitive
legitimacy, based on taken-for-grantedness. However,
cognitive legitimacy is less useful in evaluating ISR
because of the lack of stable and shared assumptions about
industry’s role in governance (Baur and Palazzo 2011).
Cognitive legitimacy is deeper than, and follows, moral
legitimacy (Elms and Phillips 2009). Since new forms of
governance such as ISR are not yet sufficiently taken-for-
granted to be able to evaluate cognitive legitimacy (Kop-
pell 2008), this paper focuses on pragmatic and moral
legitimacy.
Others have applied Suchman’s distinction between
pragmatic and moral legitimacy in related contexts such as
implementing codes of ethics (Long and Driscoll 2008),
social enterprise (Dart 2004), NGOs as partners of industry
(Baur and Palazzo 2011), or of regulatory regimes (Black
2008). Some prior studies have also examined whether
particular ISR schemes have pragmatic and moral legiti-
macy, as in the case of Schepers’ (2010) and Cashore’s
(2002) evaluations of the Forest Stewardship Council.
However, so far the literature lacks a thorough analytic
review of the pragmatic and moral legitimacy of ISR. Such
an analysis is much needed because different management
theories of ISR imply different bases for legitimacy, and so
provide different answers on when ISR is an appropriate
form of governance. The next section reviews the prag-
matic legitimacy of ISR from each management theory
tradition to provide a foundation for further analysis.
The Pragmatic Legitimacy of Industry Self-
Regulation
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on self-interested calcula-
tions of an organization’s most immediate audiences. It is
an exchange-related form of legitimacy based on an orga-
nization’s capacity to persuade key stakeholders of its
usefulness (Elms and Phillips 2009). An analytic review of
ISR research reveals four core benefits to firms and their
immediate stakeholders from ISR: to maintain strategic
control, to gain reputation, to leverage networks and to
learn how to address social issues. This section will
demonstrate how these benefits are discussed in all three
families of management theory. While each theoretical
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perspective differs in the relative importance placed on
each of these exchange-based benefits, each view accepts
that ISR schemes may be granted pragmatic legitimacy by
key stakeholders for a variety of reasons (see Table 1).
Strategic Control
The first set of benefits for ISR participants is to maintain
the ability to respond to social issues on their own terms.
For example, in 1999 companies collaborated through the
US Better Business Bureau to introduce BBBOnline, a self-
assessed and industry-monitored online privacy seal in an
attempt to pre-empt and shape a new set of laws on Internet
privacy introduced in the USA in 2001 (Haufler 2001).
Strategic management theory explains that firms may use
ISR to strategically pre-empt costly sanctions or require-
ments from governments, NGOs, consumer groups or other
stakeholders (Majumdar and Marcus 2001; Fleckinger and
Glachant 2011). Institutional theories describe ISR as a
strategic response to institutional pressures, where man-
agers try to retain agency within the constraints of actual or
potential regulatory control (Oliver 1991; Hoffman 1999;
Wijen 2014). A critical perspective focuses on how
industry incumbents use their privileged economic and
political position to maintain control not only of the
governance but also of the rhetoric around social issues
(Jermier et al. 2006). Bartley (2005), for example, showed
how the US apparel industry succeeded in replacing a
discourse of legal compliance with one based on compli-
ance to voluntary industry codes in response to rising
stakeholder concerns about sweatshop labour. This enabled
firms to maintain control over compliance through partic-
ipating in the Fair Labor Association (FLA) to certify
labour standards. Thus, all three management theories
recognize ISR as a way for firms to retain strategic control
over aligning their own interests with other stakeholders,
which is crucial for gaining pragmatic legitimacy.
Reputation
Firms also gain private benefits from ISR through earning
or maintaining a sound reputation on social issues.
Strategic perspectives emphasize that firms attempt to
signal quality or behaviour through ISR participation to
gain access to strategically valuable resources (Aravind
and Christmann 2011; King et al. 2005). Institutional per-
spectives focus on the extent to which firms are seen to be
behaving according to stakeholder expectations (Jiang and
Bansal 2003; Delmas and Toffel 2008). Critical scholars
emphasize status and the extent to which firms are seen to
Table 1 Pragmatic legitimacy of industry self-regulation
Private
benefits
Description Strategic perspective Institutional perspective Critical perspective
Strategic
control
Maintain the ability to respond to social issues
on the firm’s own terms
Meeting stakeholder
expectations flexibly
and at lower cost
(Majumdar and
Marcus 2001;
Coglianese and Nash
2001)
Maintaining agency to
respond to institutional
pressures
(Gunningham and Rees
1997; Hoffman 1999;
Zietsma and Lawrence
2010)
Exerting control over
rhetoric and
resources
(Raynolds et al. 2007;
Gereffi et al. 2001;
Moog et al. 2015)
Reputation Position firm to gain positive social evaluations
from other stakeholders for social
performance
Signalling quality or
behaviour
(King et al. 2005;
Aravind and
Christmann 2011)
Meeting stakeholder
expectations
(Jiang and Bansal 2003;
Boiral 2007)
Demonstrating prestige
and status
(Fuller and Tian 2006;
Boiral 2013)
Network
benefits
Advantages increase with the number or esteem
of members in an ISR scheme
Reputation commons
and club theory
(Barnett and King
2008; Prakash and
Potoski 2006)
Institutions shape collective
actions
(Ostrom 1990; Delmas and
Montes-Sancho 2010)
Authority of high-
status actors to set
norms
(Levy and Egan 2003;
Renard 2005)
Learning Learn how to cope with social concerns where
there is uncertainty about social issues firms
face and how to deal with them
Learning as a
competitively
valuable capability
(Locke 2013)
Mimetic isomorphism and
shared norms
(Braithwaite 2008; Matten
and Moon 2008; Haack
et al. 2012)
Diffusing shared
rhetoric
(Green 2004;
Christensen et al.
2013)
Works cited are illustrative only. Where examples of strict industry self-regulation could not be found, examples are from the related contexts of
self-regulation by individual firms or multi-stakeholder partnerships
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be performing social responsibility (Fuller and Tian 2006;
Boiral 2013). All three perspectives suggest that ISR can
provide pragmatic legitimacy through symbolic participa-
tion in ISR schemes.
Network Benefits
Network effects are present when the value to the next
incremental adopter depends on the number of others who
have already adopted. Evidence on ecolabels for green
buildings, forestry and the apparel industry suggests that
the higher the rate of adoption, the more an ISR scheme is
recognized as a credible signal of environmental quality,
and the higher the benefit of adoption to the next incre-
mental adopter (Bartley 2003; Chan et al. 2009). ISR
schemes can also be seen as ‘‘green clubs’’ (Prakash and
Potoski 2006) that protect an industry’s common reputation
(King et al. 2002). These schemes can help develop the
collective reputation, resources, staff, networks and
expertise that lower the cost to individual firms of partic-
ipation and are particularly successful in ‘‘small worlds’’
such as forestry (Conroy 2007) or the Chinese toy manu-
facturing industry (Lin-Hi and Blumberg 2016) where all
the major players know each other. Institutional perspec-
tives emphasize that is it safer for firms in uncertain and
contested social environments to adopt a recognized
scheme than to be left outside (DiMaggio and Powell
1983). The higher the ratio of certified to non-certified
firms in a local ISR scheme, the more likely are new
entrants to participate to signal their similarity (Husted
et al. 2016). A more critical perspective asks how ISR
regimes gain the authority to govern particular social issues
(Cashore 2002), highlighting the importance of high-status
political actors in encouraging others to participate (Levy
and Egan 2003). As Renard (2005) demonstrated in the
context of fair trade labelling, networks can be vital to
encouraging widespread participation in an ISR scheme,
but can also further embed existing power structures within
an industry. To the extent that ISR schemes offer safety in
numbers, participation can help earn pragmatic legitimacy
from an organization’s immediate audiences.
Learning
Finally, firms participate in ISR schemes as a way to learn
in an uncertain environment. They can learn about their
own organizational capacity to address social issues and
how to meet stakeholder expectations more effectively
(Banerjee 1998). Participation in a scheme can facilitate
the transfer of best practices and increase communication
and information sharing between members through direct
contact (Kraatz 1998; King and Lenox 2000). Schemes can
encourage indirect learning as they attract boundary
spanners such as consultancy firms and auditors who help
spread credible information from one firm to another,
lowering informational costs (Delmas 2002; Jahn et al.
2005). Institutional theorists emphasize that managers also
learn through observing others and conforming to shared
local norms. ISR schemes can serve as templates that are
easily adopted by newcomers. Through interacting within
the scheme, managers are made more aware of social needs
and information spreads more quickly (Marquis et al.
2007). Focusing on the rhetoric of ISR, critical theorists
also ask how managers learn to talk about social issues and
solutions (Green 2004). Even weak ISR can serve as
‘‘aspirational talk’’, and the beginnings of a learning pro-
cess (Christensen et al. 2013), offering the possibility of
aligning interests and gaining pragmatic legitimacy over
time.
Private Benefits and Pragmatic Legitimacy of ISR
ISR schemes earn pragmatic legitimacy as participants
persuade their stakeholders of the scheme’s usefulness.
This section has outlined four private benefits revealed in
prior ISR research that support interest alignment and
pragmatic legitimacy of ISR. Although different manage-
ment theory perspectives have analysed ISR based on
widely divergent assumptions, each has touched upon the
core private benefits of strategic control, reputation, net-
work benefits and learning. Analysts in the strategic man-
agement tradition have tended to approach the benefits of
participation from a narrow, enlightened self-interest per-
spective, and so have most clearly articulated the private
benefits of ISR. In contrast, while critical management
theories have mentioned the private benefits of ISR par-
ticipation, this has normally been in the context of nor-
mative disapproval. ISR participation may secure control
over rhetoric and resources (Raynolds et al. 2007; Gereffi
et al. 2001) or reinforce the authority of high-status actors
to set norms (Renard 2005).
However, while ISR schemes may offer private benefits
and pragmatic legitimacy from the organization’s most
proximate audiences, schemes may still not be in the
overall public interest (Vogel 2008). Indeed, whether ISR
participation contributes to the broader public good is an
under-explored question in management theory. Pragmatic
legitimacy alone is not an adequate basis for evaluating
legitimacy since it only takes account of transactional
interest alignment with immediate audiences. Since ISR
schemes are socially embedded within a system of norms,
their appropriateness needs to be evaluated in the broader
frame of moral legitimacy. The next section develops this
by applying Suchman’s (1995) typology of moral legiti-
macy to the ISR context to evaluate the moral legitimacy of
ISR schemes.
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The Moral Legitimacy of Industry Self-Regulation
Moral legitimacy asks whether a particular action, prac-
tice, scheme or organization is ‘‘the right thing to do’’
(Suchman 1995: 579). It differs fundamentally from
pragmatic legitimacy because it focuses on the ethical
foundations of an organization or activity (Mele´ and
Armengou 2015), and the reciprocal responsibility norms
generated between an organization and its stakeholders
(Elms and Phillips 2009). Assessing moral legitimacy
requires looking beyond pragmatic evaluations based on
interest alignment, to a broader public perspective on the
normative appropriateness of ISR. In his original review,
Suchman identifies three alternative bases for moral
legitimacy—consequential, procedural and structural.
Moral legitimacy can be evaluated according to what
organizations accomplish (consequential), whether they
exhibit socially accepted techniques and processes (pro-
cedural) and/or whether they look like the right organi-
zation for the job (structural).
Previous management research has tended not to focus
on the moral legitimacy of ISR. This has led to an overly
private and transactional approach to evaluating ISR
schemes. In response, this section draws together past ISR
research and outlines how ISR schemes have been evalu-
ated according to each of Suchman’s bases for moral
legitimacy. It shows how each management theory per-
spective has tended to emphasize different bases of moral
legitimacy (Table 2), and why this matters for evaluating
ISR.
Consequential Legitimacy
Consequential legitimacy focuses on the outcomes of ISR.
This approach derives from a rationalist view that ‘‘orga-
nizations should be judged by what they accomplish’’
(Suchman 1995: 580). Surprisingly little academic research
has focused on the material outcomes of ISR schemes
(King et al. 2012), and existing evidence on the outcomes
of ISR schemes is mixed at best. Famous examples of ISR
schemes that are generally assumed to improve partici-
pating firms’ social or environmental performance over
time include the chemical industry’s Responsible Care
Program (King and Lenox 2000), the Equator Principles for
responsible project finance (Haack et al. 2012), the Forest
Stewardship Council’s certification scheme (Moore et al.
2012) and ISO 14001 (Prakash and Potoski 2006). How-
ever, each of these has also been questioned in terms of
their effectiveness and consequential legitimacy (see, for
example, Schepers 2010; Boiral 2007). Empirical studies
show that the environmental performance of participating
firms in the US chemical industry’s Responsible Care, the
ISO 14001 standard and sustainable agriculture certifica-
tion is no better and in some cases is worse than that of
non-participants (Russo and Harrison 2005; Blackman and
Rivera 2011; Gamper-Rabindran and Finger 2013).
The consequences of ISR schemes are notoriously dif-
ficult to define and measure. Indeed, one of the problems in
evaluating ISR effectiveness is the different ideologically
driven perspectives on ISR effectiveness from whose per-
spective, over what time period and as compared to what
Table 2 Moral legitimacy of industry self-regulation
Strategic perspective Institutional perspective Critical perspective
Consequential
legitimacy
Firm-level outcomes
Short-term, direct, measurable effects
(Rivera 2002; Blackman and Rivera 2011)
Field-level outcomes
Short-term behaviour change; longer-
term field reconfiguration
(Hoffman 1999; Haack et al. 2012)
Social, symbolic and
material outcomes
Long-term and diffuse
effects
(Boiral 2013; Christensen
et al. 2013)
Procedural
legitimacy
Credible performance signal
Monitoring and sanctions for non-compliance
(Lenox and Nash 2003; Darnall and Carmin 2005;
Aravind & Christmann 2011)
Stakeholder disclosure and scrutiny,
including regulators
Codification of norms
Interpretive flexibility
(Wijen 2014; Terlaak 2007; Short and
Toffel 2010)
Ambition of performance
levels
Transparency and
accountability
Relationship to state
(Moog et al. 2015; Renard
2005)
Structural
legitimacy
Fit with competitive and regulatory context
(Prado 2013; Rivera 2002)
Demonstrates socially
acceptable values and norms
Consistent with regulatory demands
within field
(Locke, Rissing and Pal 2013; Lee
2009)
Authoritative emblems
and discourses
Nested within governance
networks
(Cashore 2002; Gilbert
and Rasche 2007)
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(Gupta and Lad 1983). Past studies have assessed the
consequences of ISR schemes by examining the extent to
which schemes fulfil the functional or governance func-
tions they were designed to serve (Hahn and Pinkse 2014;
Wijen 2014), whether they encourage participation (Prado
and Woodside 2015; Schuler and Christmann 2011),
whether they trigger pro-social behaviour change in par-
ticipating firms (Terlaak 2007; Schuler and Christmann
2011), whether they improve allocative efficiency (Max-
well et al. 2000; Fleckinger and Glachant 2011) and ulti-
mately whether they deliver material improvements in the
social domains they are designed to address (Blackman and
Rivera 2011; Darnall and Sides 2008; Aravind and
Christmann 2011).
Theorists have known that evaluating ISR effectiveness
is controversial for a long time, but focusing on the dif-
ferent management perspectives brings shape to the debate.
Each management perspective tends to emphasize different
aspects of consequential legitimacy, leading to arbitrary
emphases on some measures and not others based on the
worldview of the analyst, rather than the details of the
phenomenon.
Strategic perspectives on ISR tend to evaluate the con-
sequences of ISR by firm-level outcomes (see Table 2).
This includes whether participation in ISR schemes gen-
erates private benefits to the firm such as the ability to
charge higher prices (Rivera 2002), or improves firm-level
social or environmental performance (Blackman and Riv-
era 2011). Given the focus on the firm level, strategic
perspectives tend to emphasize short-term, direct and
measurable effects of ISR participation. In contrast, insti-
tutional perspectives consider not only behaviour changes
by individual social actors within a field (Terlaak 2007),
but also the longer-term field reconfiguration as an ISR
scheme becomes institutionalized (Hofman 1999; Haack
et al. 2012). Critical perspectives examine longer-term and
diffuse effects of ISR schemes, including how ISR alters
symbolic representations of reality (Boiral 2013) and the
overall governance within a policy domain (Renard 2005).
Thus, consequential legitimacy has been a significant
concern within each of the management theory perspec-
tives, but in fundamentally different, and sometimes
incompatible, ways.
Procedural Legitimacy
Since it is so difficult to evaluate the consequences of ISR,
for whom and when, an alternative is to instead rely on
evaluating the design of the schemes. Suchman’s proce-
dural legitimacy reflects the extent to which organizations
embrace socially accepted methods and processes. In the
absence of unambiguous evidence that an ISR scheme has
positive outcomes, firms instead demonstrate ‘‘sound
practices [which] may serve to demonstrate that the orga-
nization is making a good-faith effort to achieve valued,
albeit invisible, ends’’ (Suchman 1995: 580). In the case of
ISR, the procedural legitimacy of the scheme’s methods
and processes is usually demonstrated through stringency
of ISR design. Schemes with strong monitoring, third-party
auditing, government involvement and highly codified
processes are usually assumed to provide the most proce-
dural legitimacy (Delmas and Terlaak 2001; Christmann
and Taylor 2006; Darnall and Sides 2008; Short and Toffel
2010). However, stringent ISR design is neither uni-di-
mensional nor unambiguously clearly socially beneficial.
ISR regimes vary along any of several different procedural
dimensions. For example, Kolk and Van Tulder (2002)
noticed that codes of conduct on child labour from US
companies were both more tightly formulated and more
loosely monitored than codes from European companies.
Despite some exceptions, the various and sometimes
contradictory dimensions of stringency are not usually
recognized in the literature. This has led to ISR theorists
from different traditions focusing on different aspects of
stringency, and to talking past each other. Different man-
agement theory traditions tend to emphasize different
dimensions of procedural legitimacy and downplay others,
regardless of whether this is the most salient in any given
circumstance. Strategic perspectives usually prioritize
monitoring and sanctions as a way to limit information
asymmetry and free-riding (Lenox and Nash 2003; Darnall
and Carmin 2005). In contrast, institutional perspectives
emphasize codification and the flexibility provided by
ambiguous norms in self-regulation (Edelman 1992; Wijen
2014), or interactions with the broader institutional context
(Gunningham and Rees 1997; Lee 2009; Short and Toffel
2010). Critical perspectives often question the ambition or
transparency of ISR schemes (Cashore 2002; Gilbert and
Rasche 2007; Moog et al. 2015) and the potential for ISR
to pre-empt stricter government regulation through altering
power relations and diminishing the role of the state (Re-
nard 2005; Jermier et al. 2006). Thus, each tradition has a
distinctive, but usually implicit view on which aspects of
procedural legitimacy are most useful in evaluating the
moral legitimacy of ISR schemes, with no one tradition
addressing all aspects of procedural legitimacy.
Structural Legitimacy
Structural legitimacy asks whether an ISR scheme is ‘‘the
right organization for the job’’ (Suchman 1995: 581).
Structural legitimacy is less about consequences and pro-
cedural actions, and more about the structural appearance
of an ISR scheme and its place within the broader gover-
nance system. Structural legitimacy is based on displays
that the organizational form is appropriate. However, as
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Suchman put it, ‘‘this sense of rightness has more to do
with emblems of organizational identity than with
demonstrations of organizational competence’’ (p. 581).
Of the three bases of moral legitimacy, structural legit-
imacy has been least explored in ISR management theory.
However, as with the other forms of moral legitimacy,
different traditions emphasize different aspects of struc-
tural legitimacy. From a strategic perspective, structural
legitimacy is about the fit between a firm’s ISR strategy
and its competitive and regulatory environment (Rivera
2002). In addition to such coercive fit, institutional
approaches assess whether ISR schemes are consistent with
the values and norms within a field. Credentials such as
ISO certificates can serve as ‘‘organizational degrees’’
(Boiral 2012), or useful objects to signal credibility (Del-
mas and Montes-Sancho 2011). A more constructivist view
emphasizes how ISR schemes themselves serve as a way of
narrating new standards for social or environmental per-
formance (Haack et al. 2012). Critical perspectives claim
that ISR schemes can serve as ‘‘organized exhibitions of
authority’’ that demonstrate social appropriateness but
without any real connection to improving firms’ social
performance (Bowen 2014; Boiral 2013).
Management Theories of ISR and Moral Legitimacy
The three management theory perspectives have evolved
separately over the last two decades, resulting in parallel
ISR literature talking past each other. Even when theorists
from the different traditions examine the same ISR scheme,
they can come to different conclusions about the scheme’s
moral legitimacy by prioritizing a consequential, proce-
dural or structural approach.
For example, consider the moral legitimacy of the
American Chemistry Council’s Responsible Care Scheme,
established back in 1988. Taking a strategic perspective,
Gamper-Rabindran and Finger (2013) evaluated the con-
sequential legitimacy of the Responsible Care scheme by
focusing on the environmental performance outcomes of
participating compared with non-participating firms. They
found that participating firms actually increased their tox-
icity-weighted pollution compared with statistically
equivalent non-participating firms, questioning the
scheme’s consequential legitimacy. Gunningham’s (1995)
institutional perspective focused on Responsible Care’s
codes of practice and community engagement processes as
adopted in Australia, arguing based on procedural legiti-
macy that it is ‘‘the most significant and far-reaching self-
regulatory scheme ever adopted in Australia, or arguably,
elsewhere’’ (p. 61). In contrast, critical perspectives
emphasize symbolic importance of Responsible Care as a
response to the 1984 disaster that killed some 2500 people
at the Union Carbide subsidiary in Bhopal, India (Gereffi
et al. 2001). The chemical industry needed to take steps to
regain public acceptance after Bhopal, and ‘‘a code of
conduct, a certificate, even literally a ‘symbol’, was nec-
essary to communicate those steps’’ (Matten 2003: 224).
Critical theorists explain this as an attempt by the chemical
industry to maintain the structural legitimacy of the pre-
vailing regulatory system and Responsible Care within it.
Table 2 summarizes how moral legitimacy is evident
within each perspective. Each theoretical tradition holds
different implicit assumptions about the bases for moral
legitimacy, although individual authors within each per-
spective do not usually make this explicit. Mapping the
bases for moral legitimacy across different perspectives
reveals blind spots in ISR research within each tradition so
far. For example, within the strategic management per-
spective with its focus on the comparative analysis of
different outcomes in different circumstances, there has
been inadequate attention to evaluating the long-term,
indirect and social consequences of ISR schemes (King
et al. 2012). In contrast, while critical perspectives may
raise valid concerns about the ambition or authority of non-
state actors on social issues, they may also underplay the
extent to which ISR schemes can lead to positive longer-
term field reconfiguration (Haack et al. 2012).
Tensions Between Pragmatic and Moral
Legitimacy
This paper has so far treated pragmatic and moral legiti-
macy separately. However, the pragmatic legitimacy that
can provide the basis for a social licence to operate is not
the same as the more stable moral legitimacy based on
ethical principles (Mele´ and Armengou 2015) and recip-
rocal responsibility (Elms and Phillips 2009). Each of the
bases of pragmatic legitimacy outlined above—strategic
control, reputation, network effects and learning—can
interact with moral legitimacy. This section identifies ten-
sions between pragmatic and moral legitimacy, and the
management theory perspectives in which the tensions are
based. This is useful to identify blind spots and to generate
routes forward for future theory and practical evaluations
of ISR.
Strategic Control and Moral Legitimacy
Many ISR schemes offer participants options to decide
whether to participate, and if so, how. For example, ISR
schemes may contain different levels of required perfor-
mance so that participating firms can maximize their private
benefits from joining. Discretionary schemes can offer the
strategic control needed for managers to respond to stake-
holder demands for social improvement, but to do so on their
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own terms. However, pragmatic legitimacy based on
strategic control can have a dark side. The strategic goal of
ISR participation can be to limit the need to change beha-
viour, either in advance of regulation or later when the
industry’s preferred approach may be subsequently adopted
as a new regulatory standard (Ogus 1995; Fleckinger and
Glachant 2011). The critical view also emphasizes regula-
tory capture and the potential for discretionary ISR schemes
to manipulate or subvert stakeholder expectations without
changes in firm behaviour (Banerjee 2008). Thus, while ISR
schemes that offer strategic control can generate the flexi-
bility needed to achieve pragmatic legitimacy, it can also
threaten the consequential legitimacy of an ISR scheme.
Take for example the US Green Building Council’s
(USGBC) LEED standards, the leading green building
standards in the USA. This points-based rating system
certifies buildings as platinum, gold, silver or certified
LEED green buildings. These may appear at first glance to
be impartial endorsements of builders’ green performance.
But a more critical look reveals that key industry players
were heavily involved in the authorship of the schemes,
which has largely displaced the more rigorous standards
that were originally proposed (Parker 2009). The USGBC
is often mistaken to be a government agency, but was
originally a coalition of builders, consultants and property
developers who realized that they needed to respond to
stakeholder demands for greener buildings. They designed
a flexible scheme that offered firms control over which
technologies to implement to earn a green building label
and therefore meet the pragmatic legitimacy expectations
of their immediate stakeholders. This flexibility encour-
aged builders to strategically target the cheapest and least
environmentally impactful building features, or to target
the lowest acceptable tier of LEED certification, which
offers very little material improvement to the environment
from the building (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007).
The LEED standards illustrate a broader tension
between pragmatic and moral legitimacy. ISR schemes can
help participants maintain strategic control, but in order for
this to be effective, participants’ interests must somehow
dominate those of other stakeholders. Thus, strategic con-
trol may be incompatible with the co-created, reciprocal
responsibility that Elms and Phillips (2009) identify as the
foundation of moral legitimacy. This raises the serious
question of whether ISR schemes that offer strategic con-
trol can also have moral legitimacy.
Reputation and Moral Legitimacy
Seeking reputation is a pragmatic motivation for estab-
lishing product-level certification schemes such as organic
food or fair trade product labels, as well as company-level
reporting and disclosure schemes. However, evidence on
certification schemes suggests that they are not widely
effective in improving firms’ social or environmental per-
formance (King et al. 2012). This lack of effectiveness is at
least partly because ISR schemes designed to confer rep-
utation often emphasize persuasion to confer pragmatic
legitimacy rather than the co-creation of norms and actions
required for moral responsibility.
The institutional perspective explains howmanagers may
get caught up in larger structural pressures that require them
to implement, measure, monitor and report on social per-
formance (Bromley and Powell 2012). Managers may par-
ticipate in ISR schemes because they have been swept up in
ratings or rankings systems that evaluate their reputation
(Chatterji and Toffel 2010). Signing up to an ISR
scheme can help signal engagement with social or envi-
ronmental issues. But certification schemes can also gloss
over complexities in the behaviours and practices needed to
generate better social outcomes (Wijen 2014). ISR schemes
that provide reputation and pragmatic interest alignment can
hide considerable ambiguity on how the scheme is put into
practice and whether it is the right organization for the job.
Consider the example of CarbonNeutral certification.
Achieving certification is intended to help firms stand out
from their competition and provide a ‘‘clear sign’’ that they
are leading the way on climate change (Carbon Neutral
Company 2016), that is, to offer pragmatic reputational
benefits. To join this ISR scheme, participating firms need
to meet a set of highly codified criteria that are outlined in a
‘‘Carbon Neutral Protocol’’ (Carbon Neutral Company
2013). Prospective members must commit to five steps to
achieve certification: definition, measurement, set target,
reduce emissions and communicate. Crucially, the ‘‘reduce
emissions’’ stage differs from other definitions of carbon
neutrality (Department of Energy and Climate Change
2009) because it allows all reductions to be made though
offsetting and does not require individual firms to change
their own internal emissions behaviours.
Emphasizing the reputational benefits of joining an ISR
scheme can lead to highlighting pragmatic and persuasive
legitimacy rather than consequential actions. Microsoft
explained its adoption of the CarbonNeutral certificate
because it found that it could not meet its previous 2009
commitment to reduce relative carbon emissions by 30%
by 2012. Microsoft’s new cloud computing business model
was driving gross carbon emissions up, so in order to
protect its environmental reputation the firm opted for the
pragmatic legitimacy of achieving certification rather than
the consequential legitimacy of actually reducing its own
internal emissions (Microsoft 2012). Certification schemes
such as this illustrate the tension in ISR between the
pragmatic legitimacy gained through persuasion and the
moral legitimacy of consequential changes in behaviours
and performance.
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Network Effects and Moral Legitimacy
Some ISR schemes offer economies in membership, or
collective shelter from institutional pressures by following
the example of dominant firms in the field. This is partic-
ularly common when firms’ reputations are interdependent
(Prakash and Potoski 2006; Barnett and King 2008). On the
plus side, ISR schemes designed to harness pragmatic
legitimacy through network effects can lead to positive
spillover and multiply positive impacts. For example,
Reich et al. (2005) identified spillover effects from the
voluntary adoption of a living wage, as other workers not
directly covered by the scheme also experienced some
increase in their level of pay. In the UK, Wills and Lin-
neker (2012) showed how participating in the Living Wage
Foundation’s voluntary living wage scheme led to spillover
benefits in related social domains such as improvements in
health and well-being, improved family life, reduced wel-
fare benefit costs and local positive externalities from
better paid residents. ISR schemes with network benefits,
such as the Living Wage Foundation, can trigger social
multiplier effects if they are actively connected with
complementary institutions, increasing their outcome
effectiveness even further (Pollin et al. 2002; Freeman
2005). Extensive cross-monitoring and dialogue can lead to
networked legitimacy, where the ISR scheme draws toge-
ther a nexus of interests and each participant gains its own
pragmatic legitimacy (Mele and Schepers 2013).
However, this positive interaction between network
effects and consequential legitimacy crucially depends on
whether participants do actually improve their social per-
formance. Critical theorists describe how network effects
can support shared discourses and industry-led schemes
that consolidate the power of large corporations without
altering corporate behaviour (Banerjee 2008; Bowen
2014). Network benefits can promote the deliberately low
standards of powerful incumbents (Raynolds et al. 2007).
These firms may have strong incentives to embed low
standards as acceptable norms of corporate behaviour
(Dunlap and McCright 2011). Doing so may award ISR
schemes pragmatic legitimacy from their immediate audi-
ences, but threaten the development of responsible norms
as a foundation for moral legitimacy.
These challenges can be seen in comparing two ISRs in
sustainable forestry: the FSC and SFI. Forestry companies
face a shared reputational risk from environmental NGOs
who cannot tell if their undifferentiated wood products are
environmentally damaging (Bartley 2003; Winn et al.
2008). Both the FSC and SFI are voluntary ISR pro-
grammes that were initiated at the industry level: by the US
forestry industry in the case of SFI, and by socially con-
cerned retailers in the case of FSC (Cashore 2002). In the
early days of sustainable forestry certification, the US
forestry industry actively resisted the FSC’s more ambi-
tious standards, preferring instead to start their own lighter
touch, SFI scheme in order to attract more participants
(Coglianese and Nash 2001; Meidinger 2006). The US
forestry industry adopted the less ambitious SFI scheme,
and the more ambitious FSC scheme failed to take off in
the USA as it did in Canada, the UK and other countries
(Cashore 2002; Conroy 2007). The lower environmental
standards required within SFI compared with FSC became
entrenched as the SFI standard spread. Worse, because
forestry certification is interlinked with other schemes,
such as for green buildings, this consequential legitimacy
loss spilled over into other US industries when the USGBC
controversially decided to award LEED points for using
SFI-certified wood in their buildings.
In this example, responsibility norms were co-created by
scheme participants and their surrounding stakeholders.
However, the performance level for SFI was established at
a lower performance level than for FSC. More generally,
the moral legitimacy of ISR schemes with potent network
effects crucially depends on the ethical foundations of the
emerging shared norms (Mele´ and Armengou 2015).
Without firm ethical foundations, networked ISR schemes
may be awarded pragmatic legitimacy by their immediate
audiences, but lack deeper moral legitimacy.
Learning and Moral Legitimacy
ISR schemes vary in their potential scope for learning
opportunities and the extent to which these learning
exchanges are actually realized (Coglianese and Nash
2001). ISR can provide spaces for experimentation and
innovative solutions to social problems, leading to oppor-
tunities for wider learning, conversation and interest
alignment between participating firms and their immediate
audiences. ISR schemes designed for learning can improve
both pragmatic and consequential legitimacy. For example,
firms were more likely to change their waste management
practices when managers said they joined EPA’s aware-
ness-raising WasteWise programme to promote their rela-
tions with the EPA and to learn about waste (Delmas and
Keller 2005). Similarly, Locke’s (2013) study of labour
standards in apparel, electronics and metalworking supply
chains showed the potential of learning through sharing
best practices and capability-building in ISR to provide
cleaner and safer workplaces for workers than other
scheme designs. ISR on labour standards in global supply
chains has helped managers incorporate and learn from the
voices of traditionally excluded groups of workers such as
women export workers (Pearson and Seyfang 2001) and
has also stimulated learning among activists about what
worked in affecting change in previous campaigns (Free-
man 2005).
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However, as with network effects, the consequential
legitimacy of ISR schemes designed for learning depends
on what is learned and shared within the scheme. Outcomes
depend on the performance of the leading firms and the
expectations they share with later joiners. The primary
motivation to participate may be to learn how to avoid,
deflect or pre-empt more ambitious regulatory require-
ments (Ogus 1995), or to co-opt or deflect stakeholder
interests (Parker 2002; Raynolds et al. 2007). All four of
the ISR schemes examined by Lenox and Nash (2003) in
the chemical, textile and pulp and paper industries were
designed with sharing mechanisms such as industry
newsletters, annual conferences and member meetings.
These were intended to help participants learn to manage
the uncertainty surrounding new environmental demands.
However, in most of the schemes, the performance bar was
not sufficiently ambitious to offer learning to new members
on reducing pollution. Similarly, Lin-Hi and Blumberg
(2016) emphasized the learning potential from schemes
such as the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI),
which focuses on learning and capacity building to
improve working conditions in global supply chains.
However, two of the factories in the Rana Plaza building in
Bangladesh that collapsed in 2013 were participants in the
BSCI. Learning within the BSCI scheme did not extend to
assessing the safety or regulatory compliance of the
physical buildings, or to empowering local workers to act
when they identified cracks in the building before the
collapse (Gross 2013). Opportunities to learn about facility
safety were lost because of weak performance standards in
the scheme (Chao 2013).
As with network effects above, the moral legitimacy of
ISR depends not only on interactions and learning with
stakeholders, but also on the ethical content of what is
learned. Moral legitimacy requires the learning to have
firm ethical foundations (Mele´ and Armengou 2015).
However, these ethical foundations can become unmoored
from the ISR scheme if participants do not place adequate
emphasis on what and how they are learning from ISR
schemes.
Tensions and Implications
This section addressed each of the bases of pragmatic
legitimacy in turn and used past ISR research from all three
management theory perspectives to explore potential ten-
sions with moral legitimacy. Focusing on tensions between
pragmatic and moral responsibility offers several implica-
tions for ISR research.
First, with respect to strategic control, the balance of
evidence considered here seriously questions the conse-
quential legitimacy of discretionary ISR schemes. Rather
like students marking their own homework, it is tempting
for managers to award themselves the easy points but
without truly engaging with fundamental changes in their
activities. This is even the case in performance-based ISR
schemes such as the USGBC’s LEED building standards.
Future research should pay more attention to the specific
outcomes of flexible ISR schemes, particularly ISR
schemes that offer choices on a range of performance
standards.
Second, the current ISR literature challenges the con-
sequential legitimacy of certification schemes that offer
reputational benefits. Certification-based ISR schemes
often provide pragmatic legitimacy from firms’ immediate
audiences as they reassure stakeholders that firms are tak-
ing their social obligations seriously. Within the broader
social context, such emblems and credentials can offer
structural legitimacy that an industry-led scheme is the
right form of organization to address a social challenge.
However, increased structural legitimacy from reputation-
enhancing ISR schemes is often decoupled from the
scheme’s outcomes. Thus, future research should further
investigate the structural conditions of ISR schemes and
their outcomes.
Finally, for ISR schemes that offer network and learning
effects, the pragmatic reasons to participate can multiply
the positive outcomes of an ISR scheme. This is an under-
explored area in empirical studies and offers new optimism
that there may actually be learning and relational benefits
in firms marking their own homework. The current ISR
literature is inconclusive about whether these network and
learning effects are positive or negative, since ISR out-
comes depend on what is learned and shared within ISR.
More research is needed on formally modelling learning
effects and network spillover in ISR. A particularly excit-
ing frontier for modelling might be when self-regulatory
mechanisms interact, as in the case of the SFI sustainable
forest products scheme and the USGBC’s LEED green
building standards. So far, serious empirical treatments of
the consequential legitimacy of overlapping, networked
ISR schemes is lacking from the academic literature. The
wide range of ISR schemes now operating provides an
opportunity for future empirical research to explore these
ideas both within and across industry sectors.
Summary and Conclusions
In principle, ISR can provide flexible and innovative social
improvements at lower cost than direct state regulation
(Coglianese and Mendelson 2010; Gunningham and Rees
1997). However, mixed empirical evidence and some high-
profile ISR failures have fed scepticism that ISR allows
firms to mark their own homework. Although marking their
own homework may not be unambiguously bad, current
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ISR theory cannot explain when or why this may be case,
as it has not fully examined the legitimacy of ISR. While
legitimacy theory clearly separates the pragmatic legiti-
macy of gaining a social licence to operate from a deeper,
more stable moral legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Mele´ and
Armengou 2015), ISR research has been slow to recognize
this distinction. In response, this paper mapped what we
know about the legitimacy of ISR from management the-
ory, clearly separated pragmatic from moral legitimacy,
and used this distinction to expose tensions and future
directions on the legitimacy of ISR.
Theoretical Implications
This paper offers extensions to three strands within ISR
theory. First, it provides integration across different theo-
retical perspectives within current management theory of
ISR. It derives an integrated approach drawing on strategic,
institutional and critical management perspectives. Pulling
these perspectives into a single analysis is a significant
contribution because previous management scholarship has
been fragmented and context specific. Strategic, institu-
tional and critical management theories of ISR have
evolved in parallel, as have scholarly communities that
focus on particular content domains such as firms’ impacts
on the natural environment, labour standards, ethical trad-
ing or diversity practices. This paper leverages and inte-
grates across these parallel studies and offers the broader
view needed to explore the biases, blind spots and
boundary conditions of ISR.
Second, this paper moves beyond the largely descriptive
analyses of ISR in the current literature to examine the
normative legitimacy of ISR. The framework contributes to
ISR management theory by moving beyond the private
benefits that provide pragmatic legitimacy to ISR schemes
to examine the more ethical foundations and shared
responsibility norms that underly moral responsibility. The
framework derived in Table 2 can guide a comprehensive
evaluation of moral legitimacy based on the details of a
particular ISR scheme, rather than implicitly assuming
which aspect of moral legitimacy is most important as has
been so common in management theories of ISR. Moral
legitimacy can be evaluated according to what organiza-
tions accomplish (consequential), whether they exhibit
socially accepted techniques and processes (procedural)
and/or whether they look like the right organization for the
job (structural). Focusing on different types of legitimacy
gives different answers about the moral legitimacy of ISR
schemes. Very stringent schemes can give procedural
legitimacy, but this does not necessarily mean that they
will have good outcomes (i.e. consequential legitimacy).
Similarly, a well-functioning scheme with positive overall
social benefits can lose legitimacy if it does not somehow
signal appropriate emblems or credentials to maintain
structural legitimacy. Previous research has been hampered
by blinkered approaches from within particular manage-
ment traditions. This paper offers an integrative view of
moral legitimacy of ISR based on the different bases of
moral legitimacy, rather than the implied theoretical
worldview of the analyst.
Finally, the paper contributes to a burgeoning literature
on the pragmatic and moral legitimacy of other phenomena
such as codes of ethics (Long and Driscoll 2008), social
enterprise (Dart 2004), NGOs as partners of industry (Baur
and Palazzo 2011), regulatory regimes (Black 2008) or
controversial projects (Mele´ and Armengou 2015). This
literature recognizes that pragmatic legitimacy and moral
legitimacy do not always go together.
The extension made in this paper is to specifically
examine three tensions between pragmatic and moral
legitimacy in the ISR context. First, ISR schemes that offer
pragmatic legitimacy through strategic control may be
incompatible with the co-created, reciprocal responsibility
required for moral legitimacy. Participants in ISR schemes
cannot simultaneously dominate and responsibly recipro-
cate with stakeholders, leading to serious questions about
whether ISR schemes that offer strategic control can also
have moral legitimacy. Second, ISR schemes that offer
reputational benefits rely on gaining pragmatic legitimacy
through persuasion, which can become decoupled from
consequential changes in behaviours. Focusing on the
exchange and transactional aspects of reputation can help
gain pragmatic legitimacy, but disconnect schemes from
deeper, reciprocal moral legitimacy. Third, the moral
legitimacy of ISR schemes with potent network or learning
effects crucially depends on the ethical foundations of the
scheme. Ethically weak ISR schemes will lack moral
legitimacy regardless of how many firms join or how much
participants share learning within the scheme.
Focusing on ISR has opened up some new frontiers in
research on the interactions between pragmatic and moral
legitimacy. ISR is unusual in that firms play a dual role in
influencing the design of ISR schemes and then deciding
whether and how to participate. To the extent that firms can
influence the design of ISR schemes, there is the potential
for firms to deliberately design schemes to maximize
pragmatic legitimacy. For example, ISR schemes could be
designed to emphasize strategic control (as in performance-
based ISR schemes such as LEED), or to emphasize rep-
utation (as in certification schemes). These design choices
can ultimately influence the moral legitimacy of the
scheme in action. It is possible that the tensions between
pragmatic and moral legitimacy identified in this paper are
a consequence of this dual role in ISR. This analysis
challenges legitimacy theorists to assess whether these
tensions between pragmatic and moral legitimacy are
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unique to circumstances where organizations both design
and participate in governance schemes or are generalizable
to other contexts beyond ISR.
Practical Implications
This paper was partly motivated by the mismatch between
the promise and performance of ISR schemes, and a desire
to better evaluate ISR schemes in practice. Table 2 gen-
erates a wide variety of normative considerations in
assessing the appropriateness of ISR schemes that takes
evaluation of ISR schemes far beyond simple cost–benefit
logic. Scheme participants and stakeholders can use
Table 2 to generate a systematic set of questions to eval-
uate the legitimacy of specific ISR schemes. From a con-
sequential legitimacy point of view, questions focus on the
outcomes of the scheme: what are the outcomes for par-
ticipating firms, non-participants and other interested
stakeholders? What are the direct and indirect outcomes
over the short and long term? Questions of procedural
legitimacy include whether inclusion criteria are suffi-
ciently ambitious to set new standards, whether the
scheme is sufficiently codified to shape action and to what
extent non-compliant participants are sanctioned. Struc-
tural legitimacy questions ask about the extent to which the
authority of the ISR scheme is formally recognized within
the relevant country or industry, whether the ISR
scheme reflects acceptable values for its social context and
whether and how the form of the ISR conveys that firms are
performing their proper social function. Systematic ques-
tions beyond simple short-term cost–benefit analysis have
the potential to identify and develop relatively more
socially beneficial ISR schemes in the future, and ulti-
mately to improve ISR schemes in practice.
Limitations
The primary limitation of this analysis is that it is based on
an analytic review of past research from a sprawling range
of traditions and substantive policy domains. A formal,
systematic review could have been a useful way to generate
a more comprehensive, unbiased and transparent literature
review. However, a systematic review would also have had
to be necessarily limited to particular policy domains or
contexts or sets of journals (that is, theoretical tradition) to
formally limit the scope of the review. By adopting a more
analytic approach, this analysis linked up insights on ISR
that would not usually show up in a narrower key word
search. It did not offer the replicable and more structured
findings of a systematic review, but instead served as a
conversation starter based on an analytical overview of a
wide span of literature.
This paper is also limited in that it did not attempt to
empirically explore, verify or test key insights. Future
research on the structural conditions of ISR schemes and
their outcomes is particularly needed, and is now increas-
ingly possible because of the very large number of schemes
that could be compared. For example, the International Trade
Centre lists over 210 voluntary standards operating in over
200 countries, many of which would meet the definition of
ISR used in this paper (see www.standardsmap.org). Simi-
larly, www.ecolabelindex.com lists over 450 ecolabels across
25 industry sectors. Empirical researchers might collate
existing evidence on the effectiveness of these standards or
ecolabels and develop preliminary tests and categorizations
on which ones have the most learning or network potential,
and how they rank on the various dimensions of conse-
quential, procedural or structural legitimacy. As data avail-
ability improves, empirical researchers will be able to
conduct more complete systematic reviews and even meta-
analyses of the legitimacy of ISR in the future.
Conclusion
This paper examined the legitimacy of ISR in response to
mixed empirical evidence and accusations that firms are
using ISR schemes to ‘‘mark their own homework’’. It
explained how current management theory on ISR has
failed to separate pragmatic legitimacy of ISR schemes
based on private benefits, from moral legitimacy based on
reciprocal responsibilities, a firm ethical foundation and
normative approval. Mapping the literature has revealed
tensions between pragmatic and moral legitimacy, and
generated implications for theory on ISR and on legiti-
macy. Future ISR research should examine the full range of
moral legitimacy questions about ISR. Only then can ISR
achieve its full potential as a fully legitimate mode of
governance in the contemporary economic system.
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